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FORMAL AND INFORMAL SECTORS: IS THERE ANY WAGE DIFFERENTIAL? 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The main objective of this paper is to investigate if a wage difference exists between formal 
and informal sectors in the case of the Turkish labour market using a sample of wageworkers. 
To this end, we use data for 2004 and 2009 and a novel definition of the informal sector. On 
the methodological front, we adopt three alternative decomposition techniques, namely, the 
Oaxaca-Ransom (1994) decomposition in the context of mean regression, the Machado and 
Mata (2005) decomposition in the quantile regression framework and the non-parametric 
decomposition method proposed by Nopo (2008). The results reveal the existence of a wage 
gap between the two sectors. We found education and experience to be key determinants of 
earnings. The findings of this paper have implications for policies, which might be directed 
towards developing approaches with a focus on education and experience. 
 
Keywords: Informal Economies; Labour Market; Wage; Turkey. 
2 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The informal sector is a broad-ranging concept, which is difficult to define. Indeed, it 
generally includes a large number of subjects from legal to illegal and people from profit 
maximising entrepreneurs to street vendors, etc. Since it covers a wide range of economic 
activities, it is a multidimensional phenomenon encompassing a wide range of definitions and 
different measurement methods. Much theoretical and empirical research has been carried out 
relating to the informal sector and its definition and measure, reflecting its importance, 
showing that the informal sector is very difficult and challenging due to its mysterious nature 
and absence of reliable data over time (see Buehn and Schneider, 2013; Schneider and 
Williams, 2013; Williams, 2013). According to ILO (1991), the informal sector includes 
activities of the working poor who are not recognised, recorded, protected and regulated by 
public authorities. In contrast, Maloney (1999; 2004) argues that the informal sector cannot be 
defined as marginal and a disadvantaged sector. This is because it might be a voluntary choice 
for individuals and/or businesses due to various factors i.e. tax evasion, avoiding the cost of 
regulations, having greater flexibility and more freedom. Others, for example, Portes et al, 
(1989), define the informal sector as a process of income-generating activities that are not 
regulated by institutions of the society in a legal and social environment. Recently researchers 
use narrow informal sector definition, which can be defined as the paid informal sector (see 
Williams, 2012 and Vandenberg, 2014; among others). Williams (2011, p.25) defined 
informal sector as “monetised exchange that is unregistered by or hidden from the state for 
tax, social security and/or labour law purposes but which is legal in all other respects”. What 
emerges from these studies is that there is no universally accepted unique definition of what 
the informal sector is. Despite this disagreement, it is widely accepted that the informal sector 
plays a key role in the global economy (see Imamoglu et al, 2018; Williams and Nadin, 
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2012a, 2012b). Given this importance, it is crucial to try to gauge a better understanding of 
the informal sector. This paper explores two interrelated issues. Firstly, it investigates if there 
is a wage difference between the formal and informal sectors in Turkey and the extent of such 
difference. Secondly, the paper investigates the key factors explaining the wage differential 
between the two sectors. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides the literature review. In 
Section 3 we discuss the data and provide alternative definitions of labour market informality 
used in empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the econometric methodology, whilst Section 5 
focuses on the discussion of our main findings. Finally, the last section concludes the paper.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A considerable number of studies have appeared in the literature, which focused on the 
informal economic activities (Williams, 2011a; 2010; 2008; Williams & Round, 2009; 
Imamoglu, 2016; Fethi et al., 2006; 2004). On the other hand, economists have studied the 
formal-informal sector wage gap attempting to explore whether informal workers earn less 
than their formal counterpart. Alternative theories have been put forward in an attempt to 
explain this phenomenon. Along this, the traditional labour theory (see Harris and Todaro, 
1970; Field, 1990) argues that workers choose the informal sector because they are rationed 
out of the formal sector due to entry barriers (e.g. labour market regulations). Consequently, 
workers settle for informal sector jobs with lower wages. On the other hand, according to the 
competitive labour market theory (see Maloney, 1999 and 2004; Perry et al.2007; Henley et 
al. 2009) working in the informal sector reflects the worker’s own choice, which is based on 
the advantages and disadvantages associated with each sector. Under this framework, the 
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wage gap tends to disappear. The formal-informal wage gap is crucial to understand labour 
market informality, especially in developing countries, which are characterised by large 
informal sector. The reported evidence, however, appears to be mixed and inconclusive. 
Indeed, whilst some studies find that workers in the informal sector are paid less than their 
formal counterpart, other studies show that wage differentials between the two sectors may 
not be a stylised fact. For example, Marcouiller et al. (1997) show a significant wage 
premium in the formal sector in El Salvador and Peru, while in Mexico informal workers have 
higher wage premium. Monsted (2000) finds a significant formal-informal wage inequality 
for Bolivia. Henley (2001), in the context of Brazil, found that informal workers tend to earn 
less on average than their formal counterparts. Tannuri and Pianto (2002) confirm a positive 
wage gap in favour of formal workers throughout the entire wage distribution in Brazil. 
Bargain and Kwenda (2009) also measure the formal-informal wage gap in Brazil, South 
Africa, and Mexico. Their results indicate a significant gap at lower quantiles across all 
countries studied. Sookram and Watson (2008) show that formal sector workers earn more 
than informal sector workers and work experience is the most important determinant of the 
wage gap in Caribbean islands Trinidad and Tobago.  
 
Sample selection bias, which may result from either self-selection of individuals into different 
employment types (formal or informal), is the challenge in investigating the wage differential. 
Recently, some studies have focused on matching approaches to deal with a possible sample 
selection problem. For example, Pratap and Quintin (2006) find an insignificant wage gap in 
Argentina using the propensity score matching method (PSM) in contrast to OLS on standard 
Mincerian wage equations, which showed a significant formal-informal wage differential. 
Badaoui et al. (2008) examine whether individuals working in the informal sector suffer a 
wage penalty in South Africa. Using OLS regression, they find a significant informal wage 
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penalty. However, using the PSM method the results show a substantial decrease in the 
estimated wage penalty. Daza and Gamboa (2013) measure the wage gap between the two 
sectors in Colombia and find that formal workers earn between 30% and 60% more, on 
average than informal workers. In contrast to Colombia, in a more recent paper, Staneva and 
Arabsheibani (2014) find a high level of informal employment in Tajikistan with a significant 
wage gap in favour of informal workers. 
 
3. WHY SHOULD INFORMAL SECTOR MATTER IN TURKEY? 
Our focus in this paper is Turkey, which can be considered an interesting country. A number 
of studies have reported that Turkey is characterised by a large informal sector and is also 
marked by low labour force participation (Aydin et al. 2010; World Bank, 2010; Schneider et 
al. 2010; Ercan, 2011; Eurofound, 2013; TUIK, 2013; Simsek, 2014). The informal sector is a 
persistent and pervasive feature of the Turkish economy. Indeed, the informal sector is part of 
many people’s daily routines in Turkey. Aydin et al. (2010), for example, argue that the 
informal sector is growing because of both supply and demand factors in Turkey. On the 
demand side, the integration of Turkey into global markets increases price competition and 
makes producers to minimise the cost of production which lead to demand-led growth in the 
informal sector. On the supply side, the authors argue that widespread rural-urban migration 
in Turkey, associated with privatisation and a decrease in public sector employment 
encourages some workers to accept jobs with lower wages and dire economic conditions in 
the informal sector. A report by Turkey’s Ministry of Development in 2012 shows that with 
24 January 1980 decisions, Turkey’s integration to the world economy has increased and 
Turkey’s economy has been undergoing structural changes from agriculture to industry. 
Labour is moving out of agriculture and rural areas, which is followed by a high level of 
unemployment, urban informality, high inflation, a high public-sector deficit which are the 
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main characteristics of the Turkish economy. These are followed by a series of domestic and 
global crises in the 1990s and 2000s and adversely affected the fragile Turkish economy. 
According to ILO (2012), Turkey suffers from unemployment problems of particularly young 
and educated people, due to job inadequacy in the formal sector. Job creation does not keep 
up with demographic challenges and the population growing faster than the job creation (see, 
Atiyas et al. 2017; Heper and Sayari, 2013; World Bank, 2010). In Turkey, a substantial 
amount of young people is struggling to find permanent formal jobs. The ILO highlights that 
informality among these young workers in Turkey is significant (58.8%) compared with 
adults (43.8%). The report states that it is because the formal sector is unable to create 
sufficient formal employment opportunities. According to the 2009 ILO Household Labour 
Force Survey, 60% of non-agricultural informal workers are wage employees and 30.7% are 
employers and own-account workers. The World Bank’s (2010) report indicates that 55% of 
all jobs in construction, 39.6% in trade and 17% in services are informal. In a similar vein, 
Gursel (2014) points out that 85% of informal wage earners are employed in small firms. 
Simsek (2014), A Deputy Prime Minister, claims the informal sector is a key issue to tackle in 
Turkey because it slows the economic growth, production, cause significant loss of tax 
revenue and creates wage inequality. It is also important to note that Turkey has a higher 
degree of informality in comparison with European counties. For instance, the size of the 
informal sector is larger in Turkey than in the EU-27 countries (Buehn and Schneider, 2012). 
 
The evidence presented suggests that the informal sector plays a very important role in 
Turkey’s economy and has important economic and social functions. Therefore, measuring 
the size of the wage gap accurately between the formal and the informal sector represents an 
important aspect of labour market analysis to understand the functions of the Turkish labour 
market. Furthermore, it is worth examining the formal-informal wage gap in Turkey for 
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policy reasons. If the wage gap exists in favour of either formal workers or informal workers 
between the two sectors, this may suggest the existence of problems in the labour market and 
the need for policy action to prevent wage inequality as indicated by The Deputy Prime 
Minister. Wrong employment and social policies can cause undesired effects for people in the 
informal sector and can create an adverse effect on the economic performance of the country.  
 
In addition, having reviewed the existing studies several important gaps in the literature are 
observed and this paper attempt to address them. First, there has been a little discussion about 
the wage gap between the formal and the informal sector and its implications in the Turkish 
labour market. The existing evidence is not sufficient to draw any reliable conclusion about 
informality, which is very important in designing policies. Second, although the formal-
informal sector wage differential has been analysed in the context of Turkey (see for example, 
Tansel, 1999 and 2000; Baskaya and Hulagu, 2011; Tansel and Kan, 2012) most of these 
studies, with the exception of Tansel and Kan (2012), have used conventional regression 
analysis, implicitly focusing on the wage differential at the mean; thereby overlooking the 
distributional aspect.1 Ignoring the wage gap between the wage distributions has strong 
limitations in explaining the formal-informal wage gap. Third, the existing studies have 
generally used the enterprise-based definition (firm size) or legalistic definition (social 
security status) in order to define labour market informality.2 In her analysis of wage gap, 
Tansel (2000) define wage earners who are covered by social security institutions as formal 
and the self-employed have been regarded as informal. Baskaya and Hulagu (2011) used the 
semi-parametric technique to estimate the wage gap between the formal and the informal 
sector where informality is defined with respect to the registration status of individuals to 
                                                          
1 Tansel and Kan (2012) use OLS and quantile regression analyses (including the informal sector 
dummy) and estimate the fixed effect OLS and fixed effect quantile regression. 
2 Appendix Table 1 provides a summary studies for the formal-informal wage gap reviewed in Turkey. 
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social security system excluding unpaid family workers, self-employed individuals and 
employers. In 2012, Tansel and Kan reported that formal wage earners earn significantly 
higher than informal wage earners and self-employed individuals. Using the quantile 
regression, they find a decrease in informal wage penalty with the earning levels.  Kan and 
Tansel (2014) argue social security registration is a better measure of informality than 
enterprised based definition i.e. being employed in the small firm. In a more recent study, 
Baslevent and Acar (2015) define informal employment based on whether workers are 
registered with social security institution. 
 
This paper extends the existing research in two ways. First, it aims to give a comprehensive 
formal-informal wage gap analysis in Turkey by adopting three different methodologies in the 
context of mean, quantile regression and the non-parametric decomposition method. It has 
been argued that the wage gap analysis should deal with three important issues; (i) common 
support problem; (ii) identification of the wage gap at different quantiles of the wage 
distribution; (iii) selection bias. The matching method does match individuals with 
comparable characteristics and they do not require an estimation of wage equations, arbitrary 
exclusion restrictions, which are required in the regression-based decomposition methods to 
solve sample selection bias. However, it must be stressed that these methods are not 
“immune” to selection bias (Nopo, 2008; Goraus, 2013; Van Der Velde et al. 2013). Second, 
there is no unique definition of the informal sector. It is therefore very difficult to find a most 
appropriate measure of the informal sector. There are alternative definitions of labour market 
informality i.e. social security registration, contract status, firm size. However, as Henley et 
al. (2006) argue, existing alternative definitions are not consistent and, thereby, the conclusion 
drawn from any of them will be subject to missing information from any other. The current 
paper, given the importance of understanding the wage gap between the two sectors and 
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nature of informality, adopts “novel” definitions of the informal sector, namely a lower-bound 
definition and an upper-bound definition; which are likely to capture some features of the 
lower-tier segment and an upper-tier segment of the informal sector. This, then, may provide 
further insights into designing appropriate policy actions. 
 
4. DATA AND THE DEFINITION OF LABOUR MARKET INFORMALITY 
 
4.1 Data 
 
This paper uses two representative Household Budget Surveys (HBS) conducted by the 
Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT) and has been previously used by several studies on 
the Turkish labour market (e.g. Cudeville and Gurbuzer, 2007; Ben Salem and Bensidoun, 
2012). HBS covers all settlements in Turkey and is specially designed to provide information 
on income and expenditure of the households. It asks information on age, marital status, 
education, employment status and income of individuals (regular and casual employees). In 
addition, they provide information on the socio-economic characteristics of the household, i.e. 
ownership status of land, house, and consumption expenditure patterns of the households. The 
two-stage stratified sampling method was used to select sample households. It, therefore, 
provides good quality and reliable data. Our focus in this paper is to investigate the wage gap 
between the formal and the informal sector of the Turkish labour market. Therefore, this study 
is based on an adult sample of the working-age population. Indeed, the sample includes 
individuals between the ages of 15 and 64 years, inclusively, to ensure that we do not include 
people who are likely to be in child labour or retired.3 The empirical analysis focuses on wage 
earners and we consider only the main job that individuals held on the survey month. Setting 
                                                          
3Turkish law establishes the minimum working age as 15 years whilst the retirement age is 65. 
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all restrictions and dropping all observations for which missing values are observed, we have 
a total of 5809 wage earners between the age 15-64 (4530 male and 1279 female) in 2004 and 
7327 wage earners (5402 male and 1925 female). The results are reported for the sub-sample 
of wage earners broken down by the formal and the informal sector. The dependent variable is 
the logarithm of the hourly income. Hourly income is calculated by multiplying usual hours 
of work per week by 4.3 and dividing monthly income by imputed monthly hours of work. 
The monthly income is net income paid to people. Thus it includes transfers such as pension, 
social insurance deductions and taxes as well as extra income like bonuses, overtime, 
premiums etc. Hourly income is defined based on the assumption that individuals employed 
during the reference period are employed whole month. Thus, it is possible to identify 
individuals who were on job whole month. Weekly working hours are based on the main job. 
It includes overtime, but it does not include the lunch break and people commute to work. 
Those working under 35 hours a week are considered as part-time, whilst those who work 
more than 35 hours are classified as full-time.  
 
Before going further, it should be noted that, although, Nopo’s matching method (which is 
described later) eliminates the problem of specification of wage equations and thereby helping 
to prevent incorrect inferences we are aware that it does not eliminate the problem of choice 
variables. In this paper, our choice of variables is based on the human capital theory (Mincer, 
1974) where education and experience are considered to be the most important determinant of 
wages. We further include variables that show personal characteristics i.e. marital status, sex 
and job characteristics with industry sector and geographical characteristics i.e. rural-urban 
that are found to be important in explaining the wage gap (Altonji and Blank, 1999). Overall, 
we believe that these variables play a key role in explaining the formal-informal wage gap 
precisely and cannot be ignored in our matching procedure. The determinants of wages 
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include a set of variables. The independent variables are listed as follows: (i) work 
experience, which is calculated as workers’ age-adjusted by the years of schooling and school 
starting age.4 (ii) Sex, (iii) education, we use six dummies of education to capture the level of 
educational attainment of wage-earners, which are no education, primary school, primary 
education, high school, vocational high school and university. The base variable is no 
education.5 (iv) Marital status, three dummies for marital status are constructed. These are 
single, married, and another marital status. The base variable is single. (v) Employment 
location as rural or urban. (vi) We construct six dummies to capture the industrial sector. 
These are agriculture and mining sector, manufacturing and energy sector, construction 
sector, trade sector, transportation sector and finance and service sector. The base variable is 
the finance and service sector.  
 
Table 1 portrays the composition of the lower-bound and upper-bound informality by age. It 
is apparent that both lower-bound and upper-bound informality is made of young people, 
between age 15-24 and 25-34. This may be explained by the fact that they may be rationed 
out of the formal sector, particularly, workers under lower-bound informality due to 
insufficient job creation in the formal sector as reported by ILO (2012) and Atiyas et al. 
(2017). Another possible explanation for this could be that being in the informal sector might 
be a decision given its flexible work hours, worker preferences, compensation differentials 
etc., in particular under the upper-bound informality. It is somewhat not surprising that 
informality is widespread among middle-aged workers between age 35 and 46. A possible 
explanation for this might be that generous retirement scheme in Turkey encourage workers 
to leave the labour market at a young age and get involved in informal economic activities 
                                                          
4 The school start age in Turkey is 6 years. 
5 Primary school covers education between ages 6-11 and last 5 years. Secondary education includes 
all general, vocational and technical education after primary school and last 3 years. In 1997, 5-year 
compulsory education was expanded to 8-year, which consist of 5-year primary schools and 3-year 
secondary schools, which is so-called primary education. 
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because they are not required to pay taxes on their pension but are entitled to full health 
insurance. 
 
 
“Place Table 1 about here” 
 
 
4.1.1 The Definition of Labour Market Informality 
 
There are alternative definitions of informality, which correspond to different ways of 
understanding the informal sector. These definitions are generally classified into three groups: 
productive definition, legalistic definition and the enterprise-based definition. In this study, 
the following definitions are used.  
 
4.1.1.1 Definition I (enterprise-based definition): Firm size 
 
A worker is defined as working in the informal sector if he/she works in firms employing less 
than 10 workers, with the exception of those working in the professional groups.6 Those who 
work in firms employing 10 or more employees are categorised as formal. We only apply this 
classification to the workers’ main job. In this study, HBS’s questions relating to firm size 
cover a number of workers in the workplace between less than 10, 10-24 workers, 25-49 
workers and 50 workers and more. Hence, our smallest firm size is 10 or fewer workers.7 
 
                                                          
6Grouping of occupations are made according to ISCO 1988 (International Standard Classification of 
occupation). Occupational groups 1, 2 and 3, professionals, associate professionals and legislators 
respectively are excluded. 
7According to World Bank (2010), informality tends to be widespread among small firms i.e. 
employing less than 10 workers  in Turkey 
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4.1.1.2 Definition II (productive definition): Contract status 
 
Individuals are classified as informal if they do not have a contract in their main job. There is 
no direct question whether individuals have a contract or not but surveys contain information 
on job permanency, individuals are questioned whether they are permanently employed, 
temporarily employed or they are occasional workers. Individuals who have a permanent job 
are classified as contract workers and formal but individuals who have temporary or 
occasional jobs are classified as non-contract workers and therefore informal. 
 
4.1.1.3 Definition III: (legalistic definition) Social security status 
 
Individuals are classified as informal workers if they are not registered by any institutions of 
social security in their main job and they are classified as formal workers if they are. HBS 
asks all individuals in employment aged 15 years and over, regardless of their employment 
status, whether they are registered by any social security related to their main jobs. Social 
Security registration includes social insurance institutions (SSI), the retirement fund (RF), 
Bag-Kur and private registration i.e. banks. 
 
After identification of these three definitions, we construct two different estimates of 
informality, an upper-bound definition and a lower-bound definition of informality. The 
upper-bound informality represents the maximum potential number of workers in the informal 
sector according to our definitions. This includes those who are not registered for any social 
security or do not have a contract or are employed in a small firm. The lower-bound 
informality is the minimum potential number of workers and covers those who are not 
covered by any social security and do not have a contract and are employed in the small firm. 
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Unlike traditional and competitive approaches, some authors (e.g. fields, 1990) argue that the 
informal sector consists of “upper-tier segment” (voluntary entry exist) and “lower-tier 
segment”. Hence, it might be argued that lower-bound informality represents a lower-tier 
informal sector since workers in this category have no social security coverage, no contract 
and work in small firms. Upper-bound informality, on the other hand, can be considered as 
part of the upper-tier informal sector since it may include some workers close to formal 
workers. Table 2 shows the distribution of wage earners by informality status. It is very clear 
that workers can be employed without an employment contract, social security coverage and 
in small firms.  
 
A full description of the variables, along with their meaning, is presented in the Appendix, 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables for the lower-bound and the upper-bound 
definition of informality are also reported in Table 3 in the Appendix. The 2004 sample 
consisted of 5014 formal workers and 705 informal workers. The 2009 sample consisted of 
6498 formal workers and 829 informal workers. The descriptive analysis shows that formal 
workers, on average, earn more than informal workers and a significant proportion of formal 
wage earners are male under each definition of informality. Turning to education, we can see 
that a higher proportion of workers tend to work in the formal sector compared to the informal 
sector (as education levels increase). For the two samples, a higher proportion of formal 
workers have a university degree. However, primary school graduates dominate the informal 
sector. Looking at the industrial sector, we can see that agriculture and construction sectors 
dominate the informal sector while formal employment is more common in the finance and 
service sector under the upper bound and the lower bound informality. As distinct from a 
lower bound informality, a substantial number of workers in the trade sector are observed as 
informal under the upper bound informality.  
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“Place Table 2 about here” 
 
5. METHODOLOGY 
 
As stated earlier, we start the empirical analysis with the OLS regression and the 
decomposition in this framework i.e. the Oaxaca-Ransom (1994) decomposition. This is 
followed by the quantile decomposition technique based on the Machado and Mata (2005) 
technique and finally, we present the methodology based on a matching technique proposed 
by Nopo (2008). 
 
 
5.1 OLS Regression and the Oaxaca-Ransom (1994) Decomposition 
 
The analysis is based on a Mincerian earnings function, which is modelled by Mincer (1974) 
and includes experience (as a proxy for the job training), its square, education and other 
variables that are associated with individuals’ earnings. This model is specified for the formal 
and the informal sector as follows: 
 
         (1) 
 
         (2) 
 
where  denotes individuals and   refer to the log of the hourly wage of 
the individual in the formal and the informal sectors, respectively. and  represent 
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individual characteristics such as education, experience, gender, location etc.  The estimated 
earning equations for formal and informal workers are used to calculate the difference in 
wages between the formal sector and the informal sector. The Oaxaca-Ransom (1994) 
decomposition can be written as follows:8 
 
   (3) 
 
The first term on the right-hand side indicates a wage gap due to endowment differences, the 
second term shows the difference between the actual and pooled returns for the formal sector 
and the third term captures the difference between actual and pooled returns for the informal 
sector. The main problem in measuring the wage gap between the formal and the informal 
sector is trying to answer the following counterfactual question: “What happens if the 
allocation of individuals to the informal sector and the formal sector are not random?” A 
participation decision of workers to participate in any sector (endogenous selection) brings 
selectivity bias to occur and affects the formal-informal wage gap. In the context of the mean 
regression literature, Heckman (1979) provides a solution to this issue and many studies have 
adopted this procedure to correct for sample selection. To implement this procedure, a probit 
regression is run in the first stage to find the probability of working in the informal sector as a 
function of original variables and an additional identifying variable. The key identifying 
variable in this analysis is the proportion of the informal sector workers to the number of all 
workers in each household. This identifier was used by Henley et al. (2009) for Brazil and is 
expected to have a positive impact on being informal, but it is not assumed to have any impact 
on wages. It is useful to note that measuring the labour market informality is subject to data 
availability. This then leads to a practical difficulty in finding excluded variables for 
                                                          
8 . 
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regression analysis. As mentioned above, workers may not be a random sample of working 
age population. Unobserved factors may determine workers’ sectoral choice. We aim to solve 
the problem, sample selection, by introducing a correction term obtained from a probit model 
into the wage equation. Using the available data, we expect the proportion of the informal 
sector to all workers to influence the sectoral choice of workers without having a (direct) 
impact on wages. However, we are aware of potential problems related to the identification 
issue. The following selection equation is estimated using the probit separately for formal and 
informal workers. 
 
          (4) 
 
Where  shows workers are in the formal sector and  denote workers are in the 
informal sector.  is a vector of individual characteristics that determine participation status 
and  is coefficients of parameters.  is the error terms distributed as . In this process, 
the selectivity correction terms (Inverse Mills Ratio, IMR) is constructed for each sector.  
In the second stage,  is included in wage equations as an additional regressor to control for 
potential selection bias and wage equations are estimated as follows: 
 
        (5) 
 
        (6) 
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Where,  and  are estimated coefficients of  for formal and informal workers respectively. 
In the presence of sample selection, we can then write the Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition as 
follows: 
 
 (7) 
 
The last term on the right-hand side represents the selectivity effect of the wage gap, which is 
attributable to selection bias. The selectivity effect is netted out from the overall wage gap. 
When the selection effect is netted out from the overall wage gap, the wage gap is called 
“offered wage gap” (Reimers, 1983; Neumann and Oaxaca, 2004; 2005; Boymond et al. 
1994). 
 
 
5.2 Quantile Regression and The Machado and Mata (2005) Decomposition 
 
In this section, we apply the quantile regression analysis and the (MM) decomposition 
technique in this framework. One major advantage of the quantile regression over classical 
mean regression is that it captures workers’ heterogeneity in returns to observed 
characteristics and allows us to estimate the wage gap at different quantiles of the wage 
distribution. The quantile regression equations for formal and informal workers can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
     (8) 
 
     (9) 
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Where  and as before,   and    represent the log of hourly wages for the 
formal sector and the informal sector respectively for individuals  
denotes the conditional quantile of .   (slope of the quantile equation) in both QR 
wage equations represents the effects of changes in the set of individual and job 
characteristics on the conditional quantile of  It is assumed that all quantiles of  
and  , conditional on  and, are linear in  and . This then allows conditional 
quantiles of  and   to be estimated by linear quantile regression for each specific 
quantile. 
 
The MM decomposition technique is based on simulation of the conditional marginal wage 
distribution estimated through linear quantile regression. The MM method is much more 
flexible than other decomposition methods, which extends the conventional Oaxaca wage 
decomposition on the mean to the entire wage distribution and combines a quantile regression 
and a bootstrap approach. The MM process to decompose the wage gap can be described as 
follows: First, in order to undertake the decomposition analysis, wage equations for each 
sector, given are as    and   for the formal sector and the informal 
sector respectively, are estimated across different quantiles of the wage distribution. Second, 
counterfactual wage distribution using estimates from the conditional quantile regression are 
constructed based on simulation technique following several steps described as below: 
 
1. generate random sample size m (m=5000) from  a uniform distribution in 
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2. For each estimate corresponding QR coefficients for the formal sector and the 
informal sector.  
3. Obtain a random sample of size m (m=5000) with replacement from the covariates  
(characteristics of formal and the informal workers which were used to estimate QR 
coefficients) for each group of workers, , . The vector of characteristics for 
formal and informal workers is then used to estimate the log hourly wages for formal workers 
and informal workers, and   . 
4. Construct a random sample of the counterfactual earnings distribution. That is: 
counterfactual earning distribution shows the log of earning if informal 
workers had their own characteristics but were paid as formal workers. 
5. Finally, using generated coefficients and characteristics, the wage gap is decomposed 
at different quantiles of the constructed earning distributions. 
 
Machado and Mata (2005) argue that the above process produces a consistent estimator of 
counterfactual earning distribution and allows a comparison with the actual earning 
distribution. Therefore, the difference in earnings between the formal and the informal sectors 
at different quantiles are given as follows: 
 
 
 
           (10) 
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The first term on the right-hand side is the characteristics components, which show the 
contribution of the differences in labour market characteristics between the  quantile of the 
formal sector wage distribution and the  quantile of the informal sector wage distribution. 
The second term on the right-hand side indicates the wage differential due to differences in 
coefficients. The residual term includes simulation errors and tends to disappear with more 
simulations. 
 
Bargain and Kwenda (2013) argue that decomposition of the wage gap is not straightforward 
in the context of quantile regression. The authors state that there is no consensus regarding the 
most appropriate correction procedure for selectivity in this context. Buchinsky (1998) 
proposed the use of selection equation and approximation of IMR in the quantile regression. 
However, Buchinsky’s estimation procedure is criticised on the basis that it suffers lack of 
robustness and it is very sensitive to identification; since it requires the independence 
assumption to obtain partially linear representation for the conditional quantile functions 
(Montenegro, 2001; Hyder and Reilly, 2005 Huber and Melly, 2011; Bargain and Kwanda, 
2013). Buchinsky’s approach relies on the assumption of conditional independence between 
the error terms and the regressors given the selection probability. This then implies that all 
quantile regression curves are parallel, and thereby limits the usefulness of quantile regression 
and sample selection correction in this framework.9 Another problem with the quantile sample 
selection model (using the MM decomposition method) is that it is computationally high 
demanding and very time-consuming. Many authors (i.e. Mizala et al. 2011; Goraus, 2013; 
Van Der Velde at al. 2013), now, apply an innovative approach proposed by Nopo (2008), 
which uses the matching technique to investigate the wage differential. This technique is 
considered as a potential solution to the problem of sample selection. 
                                                          
9For further discussion, see Huber and Melly (2011). 
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5.3 Nopo’s (2008) Matching-Based Decomposition 
 
In this section, we decompose the wage differential between the two sectors by applying the 
non-parametric decomposition proposed by Nopo (2008). The main aim of this matching 
technique is to compare different groups with similar characteristics. More precisely, Nopo’s 
method uses matching procedure and selects sub-samples of formal and informal workers 
such that there are no differences in observable characteristics between the matched groups. 
Regression-based decompositions fail to capture differences in the support by estimation of 
wage equations for all formal and informal workers without restricting the comparison only to 
individuals with comparable characteristics (Barsky et al. 2002; Black et al. 2008; Nopo, 
2008). The matching technique, especially the Nopo (2008), recognises the importance of 
“common support” (i.e. comparing formal and informal workers with similar observable 
characteristics). It also accounts for “out-of common support”, which shows deviations for 
each group from the common support. Van Der Velde et al. (2013) argue that this matching 
technique has an advantage over conventional regression analysis. They contend that this 
approach does not only address the common support problem, it, also, allows the 
identification of the wage gap at different quantiles of the wage distribution. Furthermore, the 
authors state that this technique does not require an estimation of wage equations and 
arbitrary exclusion restrictions, which are required in the regression-based decomposition 
methods to solve the sample selection bias. Hence, it is a potential solution which is an 
alternative to the selection bias. 
 
In this framework, the formal-informal wage differential can be decomposed as follows. Let 
W denote the random variable that models both formal and informal workers’ earnings and x 
is the vector of individual characteristics i.e. education and marital status. Then, let the 
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functions    and    denote conditional cumulative distributions of individual 
characteristics, depending on being formal and informal respectively. Thus,  
and  can be interpreted as the corresponding probability measures. Further, 
assume that is the expected value of earnings of workers in the formal 
sector conditional on individual characteristics and being formal. Similarly,  
  is the expected value of earnings of workers in the informal sector, 
conditional on individual characteristics and being informal. Finally, let and  indicate 
support for the distribution of individual characteristics for formal workers and informal 
workers respectively. In this framework, the formal-informal wage gap be derived as: 
 
       (11) 
 
where  denotes the wage gap. Equation (11) can further be expressed as: 
 
      (12) 
 
Considering that support for the distribution of characteristics for formal workers, , and 
support of the distribution of characteristics for informal workers, , are different, each 
integral is then divided into two sub-groups: within the common support,    and  
out of common support,  Equation (12) is then written as follows: 
 
            (13) 
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After some algebraic manipulations of Equation (13), the wage gap can simply be expressed 
as:10 
 
         (14) 
 
where  is the part of the wage gap that is explained by differences in characteristics of 
formal and informal workers over common support. is the part of the wage gap explained 
by differences between two groups of formal workers i.e. those who have characteristics that 
can be matched to informal workers and those who cannot. is the part of the wage gap 
explained by differences between two groups of informal workers: those who have 
characteristics that can be matched to formal workers and those who cannot. accounts for 
the unexplained part of the wage gap. It is the part of the wage gap that cannot be explained 
by differences in characteristics of individuals and attributed to unobserved characteristics. 
The first three components on the right-hand side can be attributed to the wage gap that can 
be explained by differences in characteristics (explained wage gap) and the fourth term is 
attributed to the wage gap due to unobservable characteristics (unexplained wage gap) (Nopo, 
2008). 
 
6. RESULTS  
  
6.1 The Determinants of Wages 
We estimate the determinants of wages for 2004 and 2009 under the lower-bound and the 
upper-bound informality. The OLS regression estimates are presented in Appendix Table 4 
(unadjusted for sample selection bias) and Table 5 (adjusted for sample selection). The top 
                                                          
10See Nopo (2008) for detail description of the method. 
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panel, (A), portrays the results for the year 2004 whilst panel (B) shows results for the 2009 
data. The results show that, on average, the most important determinants of wages are 
education and experience. The coefficients of education dummies, as expected, are positive 
and significant in the formal sector in both samples and under both definitions of informality. 
The results show that formal workers tend to earn more as their education level increases. It is 
possible, therefore, to argue that well-educated formal workers tend to be more productive 
and earn more than workers with poorer education. Regarding the informal sector,  the impact 
of education is found not to be strong as in the formal sector under the lower-bound 
informality. Contrary to expectations, the notable finding is that the returns to education are 
found to be high in the informal sector under the upper-bound definition of informality and 
the earning premium increases as the level of education increases. Returns to experience are 
hump-shaped, which show that experience significantly contributes earning at a certain point 
and then tends to decrease wages. Compared with the formal workers, for example, informal 
workers get, on average,  an increase of over 4%  for additional years of experience (in both 
samples) whilst formal workers get over 3%  increase on their hourly wages under the upper-
bound informality.  
 
Next, we turn to the quantile regression results, which are presented in an Appendix (Tables 6 
and 7). The results show that, at each quantile, coefficients of the education dummies, as 
expected, are positive and significant in the formal sector in 2004 as well as the 2009 sample. 
However, education affects wages differently in different parts of the wage distribution in the 
formal sector. Indeed, education tends to have a larger effect at higher quantiles. As their 
education level increases workers tend to earn more. In other words, we observe a trend 
suggesting a significant increase in the wage premium for highly educated workers. Hence, it 
could be hypothesised that there is a heterogeneity in the returns to educations, which tends to 
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be larger for formal workers at higher quantiles of the wage distribution (i.e. with better 
unobserved earning capacity). With respect to informal workers, some interesting results 
emerge. The coefficients of the education dummies are positive and significant in particular 
under the upper-bound informality. As before, the estimates show that the earning premium 
increases as the level of education increases. This could be an interesting result as it implies 
that for some informal workers education is an important tool for an income improvement. 
For example, compared with those holding primary education, workers who have a high 
school, vocational high school and university education tend to earn more at each quantile of 
the earning distribution under the upper-bound informality definition. This finding is observed 
when considering both the 2004 and 2009 data. By contrast, none of the coefficients of the 
education dummies are found to be significant in the informal sector in 2009 under the lower-
bound definition. Education level, therefore, plays a very significant role in determining 
wages under the upper-bound informality in the informal sector, this is particularly true for 
the 50th, 75th and 90th quantiles. Experience contributes to better wages across the wage 
distribution in both the formal and the informal sector. The wage premium for being more 
experienced, however, is higher in the informal sector. For example, the wage premium for 
being more experienced is 4.4% at 90th quantile in the informal sector while 3.4% in the 
formal sector under the lower-bound informality in 2009. Similar results are obtained for the 
upper-bound informality and for the 2004 sample. 
 
Other results are not surprising in the context of Turkey. The coefficient of male dummy 
varies across the wage distribution. It is positive and significant suggesting men enjoy a 
higher earning advantage over women both in the formal and the informal sector. The gender 
effect on the wage tends to become smaller at higher quantiles using both definitions of 
informality. However, the coefficient of the male dummy is much larger (in magnitude) in the 
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informal sector indicating women face more wage penalty in the informal sector. The results 
mainly show that married workers tend to earn more than singles in both formal and informal 
sectors. Looking at the employment location, we can say that, in general, both formal and 
informal workers in urban areas tend to earn more than workers in rural areas. With respect to 
the industrial sector, we find that workers in manufacturing and energy, and agriculture and 
mining sectors tend to earn less than workers in the finance and service sector both in the 
formal and the informal sector. 
 
Overall, these results indicate that returns to education are high in the informal sector. There 
are several possible explanations for this result. First, this may be due to the fact that workers 
with high levels of education cannot find jobs that are suitable for them in the formal sector. 
Second, this might be related to the fact that small firms (indeed, informality is widespread 
among small firms in Turkey) pay a compensating differential to attract educated workers to 
compete with large firms. Firms in the formal sector must pay pension benefits, severance, 
frictions, social security contributions and so on. It seems possible that there may be a 
substitution, namely, firms that do not pay social security contributions may need to 
compensate well-educated workers more highly in order to make up for not giving them a 
benefit. Allowing a broader definition of the informal sector (upper-bound), there are formal 
workers who are moved into the informal sector and thereby resulting to the formal sector 
shrinking. As our results show, the returns to education are high in the informal sector under 
upper-bound informality. As such, having to rely on formal sector jobs could constitute an 
important loss of human capital when there is a movement between the formal sector and the 
informal sector. In this case, informal sector jobs could constitute an important potential of 
human capital. 
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Moreover, when the selection bias is accounted for, no substantial differences are observed 
for the explanatory variables and their effects on earnings. When contrasting the results of the 
wage equation estimates at the mean level it is clear that similar conclusion emerges 
irrespective of whether we adjust for sample selection or not. In other words, the strong 
selection of education at all levels into the formal sector remains consistent with higher 
returns to education in the formal sector and the informal sector under the upper-bound 
informality. The returns for university and vocational education are only slightly lower both 
in the formal and the informal sector. The returns to experience, on the other hand, are 
slightly higher when sample selection is taken into account. There is no discernible change 
observed in the informal sector. Regarding the gender variable, there are no significant 
differences between adjusted and unadjusted samples in 2004 and 2009 and, in both sectors. 
Men earn more than women in the formal sector under the lower-bound informality and in the 
informal sector under the upper-bound informality. In short, sample selection bias might not 
be an issue for concern after all in the context of Turkey. 
 
6.2 The Size of the Wage Gap: The Oaxaca-Ransom Decomposition, the Machado and Mata 
(2005) and Nopo (2008) Decompositions 
 
The results of the decomposition analysis based on the Oaxaca-Ransom technique are 
reported in Tables 3 through to 6. More specifically, Tables 3 and 4 present, respectively, the 
results for 2004 and 2009 without sample selection; whilst Tables 5 and 6 show the same 
results when sample selection is taken into account. The decomposition analysis shows that 
for the year 2004 the formal-informal wage gap is lower (0.675 log points) under the lower 
bound compared to the upper bound definition of informality (0.844). What is more, the 
results show that much of the wage gap (60% for the lower bound and 64% for the upper 
29 
 
bound) is explained by differences in characteristics of workers. Similar findings are also 
obtained with the 2009 data. It is worth noting, however, that the wage gap is slightly higher 
in 2009 than in 2004. As we will argue later, this difference may be due to the global financial 
crisis that started in 2007 or to changes in the size, composition and socio-economic structure 
of the population. We find that (after controlling for selection) differences in workers 
characteristics (the endowment effects) remain positive and statistically significant indicating 
that workers in the formal sector still have a higher earning advantage based on their observed 
characteristics. The notable difference is that the decomposition results show that more than 
half of the wage gap (54.5% in 2004 and 54% in 2009) is attributable to unobserved 
characteristics under the lower-bound definition of informality. In contrast to the lower-bound 
informality, differences in workers characteristics overwhelmingly explain the formal-
informal wage differential under the upper-bound informality. This is similar to what has been 
found before controlling for selection.  
 
“Place Table 3 about here” 
“Place Table 4 about here” 
“Place Table 5 about here” 
“Place Table 6 about here” 
 
Table 7 and Table 8 show results of the decomposition analysis using the MM technique for 
2004 and 2009, respectively. In the first column of each table, we present the raw wage gap 
estimates-calculated as the difference in log hourly wages between formal and informal sector 
employees at specific quantiles of the wage distribution. In subsequent columns, estimates of 
the wage gap due to differences in observable characteristics (the covariates) and the 
differences in returns to those characteristics (the coefficients) are reported. The results are 
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also portrayed graphically; Figures 1-4 plot the estimated coefficient and covariate effects 
along the wage distribution. We find that for the two years the raw difference is positive 
across the entire wage distribution indicating that the wage difference in favour of workers in 
the formal sector. The results reveal that the formal-informal wage gap is sizeable especially 
at the bottom of the wage distribution for both years. The largest fraction of the formal-
informal wage gap is attributable to both differences in workers characteristics and in the 
return to those characteristics. The unexplained component of the wage gap (coefficient 
effect) is larger at the lowest quantile, thus suggesting that the wage penalty faced by the 
informal worker is higher at the lowest quantile. The other notable finding is that the wage 
gap is higher under the upper-bound definition of informality. This difference could be 
explained by the fact that the lower-bound definition of informality gives us a minimum 
number of informal workers. Under this definition, more workers will find themselves in the 
formal sector and, thus, few workers will be in the informal sector. Hence, there are formal 
workers who could be classified as informal under the upper-bound definition of informality. 
When many low-wage formal workers are transferred from lower-bound to the upper-bound 
as informal, the average wage in the formal sector under the upper-bound informality rises, 
which may explain the large wage gap under the upper-bound informality.  
 
Another important finding is that the size of the wage gap is higher in 2009. This difference 
may be due to changes in the two samples (i.e. socio-economic structure); it may also be 
explained by the global financial crisis started in 2007, which led to a decline in economic 
activities and job losses. Along this line, Yazir (2010) reports that the global financial crisis 
has led to an increase in unemployment in Turkey by 0.7% in 2008 and 3% in 2009. More 
workers, therefore, entered the informal sector. The change in the formal-informal wage gap 
between 2004 and 2009 may also be attributable to a high level of urbanisation in Turkey due 
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to a significant migration from rural to urban areas. Adaman and Kaya (2012) point out that 
Turkey has been experiencing large rural-urban migration and thereby rapid urbanisation 
since the 1950s. They state that urbanisation increased from 25% in 1950 to 44% in 1980 and 
80% in 2010 and internal migrants are mainly involved in the informal sector. In this case, 
one would expect that the informal wage would decrease. Moreover, increased unemployment 
in Turkey (10.83% in 2004 and 14.03% in 2009) pushed workers towards the informal sector, 
thus resulting in the fall of the informal sector wage. 
 
“Place Figure 1 about here” 
“Place Figure 2 about here” 
“Place Table 7 about here” 
“Place Figure 3 about here” 
“Place Figure 4 about here” 
“Place Table 8 about here” 
 
Finally taking advantage of the matching approach, which allows us to compare workers with 
similar characteristics in both sectors, we consider differences in the distribution of their 
observed characteristics. To this end, as aforementioned, we follow the non-parametric 
matching approach proposed by Nopo (2008). Table 9 presents the estimated results of a 
matching-based decomposition where matching is based on experience, experience squared, 
marital status, education dummies, industrial sector dummies and employment location. As 
explained previously, the total wage gap is divided into four additive components and 
expressed as: . The first three components on the right-hand 
side are attributed to differences in observable characteristics and the last component is 
attributed to differences in unobservable characteristics. 
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The matching results also indicate that Turkey stands out as a country with a positive formal-
informal wage differential i.e., on average, formal workers earn more than informal workers 
although the gap is small. The total wage gap is found to be around 0.048 for the lower-bound 
informality and 0.060 for the upper-bound informality in 2004. The results, also, reveal 
contrasting differences for both samples. In fact, the results based on the 2004 sample, 
suggest that differences in observable characteristics explain much of the wage gap between 
the formal and informal sector. By contrast, results derived from the 2009 data indicate that a 
significant part of the wage gap comes from unobservables (∆O)  
 
Using the matching approach allows us to disentangle the wage differential. Hence it is 
interesting to probe further in some of the components, particularly F and  The sign of 
the coefficient of F (part of the wage difference explained by differences between formal 
workers in and out of the common support) is positive, which indicates that there are formal 
workers who have some characteristics that informal workers do not have and, these 
characteristics are highly rewarded in the Turkish labour market. In other words, these results 
demonstrate that unmatched formal workers earn more than matched formal workers on 
average. Furthermore, results from the 2009 sample reveal that an important part of the wage 
gap (0.395), which is explained, comes from differences between formal workers in and out 
of the common support. By contrast, a positive sign of the estimate of  (part of the wage 
gap is attributed to differences in characteristics of informal workers in and out of common 
support) shows that matched informal workers earn more than unmatched informal workers. 
 
Finally, the wage gap between the two sectors is also examined at different quantiles of the 
wage distribution after the matching procedure. This analysis is carried out by taking the 
difference between the wage distributions for the respective quantiles after matching. Table 
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10 reports the results. In line with the MM decomposition results, Nopo’s matching 
decomposition also shows that informal workers face a wage penalty across the wage 
distribution. 
 
“Place Table 9 about here” 
 
Also, similar to the MM decomposition results, the wage gap changes across the distribution 
of wages and it is higher in the lowest quantiles of the earning distribution. These results 
confirm that the formal-informal wage gap in Turkey is driven by differences in earnings in 
the lower quantiles of the earning distribution and more visible under the upper-bound 
informality. However, when applying the matching method, it is important to note that there 
is a declining trend in the earning differences in the common support after matching. For 
example, in relation to the 2004 sample differences in earnings in support change from a 
coefficient of 0.801 and 0.916 to 0.466 and 0.549 at the 10th quantile for the lower-bound and 
the upper-bound informality. In the same way, there is a decline in earning differences after 
matching from 0.981 to a 0.841 under the lower-bound informality and from 0.981 to a 0.865 
under the upper-bound informality at the 10th quantile in 2009. Comparisons between the 
decomposition results based on the quantile regression and the matching method suggest that, 
in general, there are no substantial differences. However, looking at the wage gap at different 
quantiles of the earning distribution in and out of the common support, it can be easily noticed 
that the wage gap is substantially higher out of the common support at all quantiles of the 
wage distribution. The formal-informal wage gap tends to be higher in the lowest quantiles 
and lower in the top quantiles of the earning distribution indicating higher informal wage 
penalty in the lowest quantiles. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
7.1 Summary of Key Findings and Implications 
In this paper, we explored whether there is a wage gap between the formal and the informal 
sector in Turkey. For this purpose, a comprehensive empirical approach is used to derive the 
results of this paper. Indeed, as an initial step, the wage gap was investigated at the mean 
using the OLS regression and the Oaxaca-Ransom (1994) decomposition method-with and 
without the sample selection. The results derived from this technique indicate a wage gap in 
favour of formal sector workers and that the wage gap was higher under the upper bound 
definition of informality. Although the mean-based decomposition is a straightforward way to 
decompose the differences in wages it does not provide a full picture of the wage gap as it 
only explains mean differences in wages. In order to overcome the limitations of the mean 
decomposition, the quantile regression and the MM decomposition were applied to take 
account of heterogeneity in the wage distribution. The results reveal a wage gap is in favour 
of formal sector workers along the wage distribution. Moreover, we found that the wage gap 
was greater at the bottom of the wage distribution in both 2004 and 2009 samples. To ensure 
robustness of our findings we adopted a non-parametric method based on matching proposed 
by Nopo (2008), which compares comparable individuals effectively. This method measures 
the formal-informal wage gap only on the observations where characteristics of formal and 
informal workers are comparable (i.e. within the common support) and thereby addresses the 
problem of common support. The findings of the matching decomposition technique 
confirmed the existence of an informal sector wage penalty. The wage gap was higher 
especially in the lowest quantiles of the earning distribution in and out of the common 
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support. Nopo’s decomposition method may be useful in helping to design more effective 
policies. The method allows formal workers to be matched to informal workers and thereby 
reducing differences between unmatched and matched workers. However, it might be useful 
to note that if there are two observationally equivalent workers, one working formally and the 
other informally, this may be the case-because formal jobs are “rationed”; but it may also be 
that there are unobservable, individual-specific characteristics such as ability or preferences 
for certain working conditions.11  
 
Taken together, the findings of this paper suggest that human capital factors (education and 
experience) have a key role in improving the wages. Most of the wage gap between the two 
sectors is explained by characteristics of workers and common characteristics that contribute 
to the wage gap are education and experience. The higher educated and more experienced 
workers are likely to have higher earnings both in the formal and the informal sector. Policies 
that promote education and equal opportunities for workers in the informal sector would 
improve earnings for many workers in Turkey by increasing productivity and incomes. 
Therefore, unlike Simsek (2014) claims, the Turkish government must attune their 
understanding of the role of the informal sector in Turkey. While efforts should be made to 
address negative aspects of the informal sector and support people in the informal sector, we 
argue that it is important not to destroy its capacity to provide livelihoods and develop output, 
employment and entrepreneurial potential. The potential of the informal sector cannot be 
overlooked.  
 
 
 
                                                          
11 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.  
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7.2 Limitations and Directions for Further Research 
 
In this paper, the analysis of wage gap between the two sectors is limited to examining wage 
earners based on cross-sectional data. Our results must be interpreted conditional on the wage 
earners. Alternatively, to capture variations in the wage differential a broader dataset, such as 
panel data, might be useful. Given the fact that the self-employed and unpaid family workers 
account for a large part of the informal sector in Turkey, an extension of the paper could 
possibly look to approach the issue from this angle. 
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Table 1: Lower-bound and upper-bound informality by age 
  
  
 
Age 
15-24                                                 
25-34 
35-46 
47-56 
57-64 
Total  
  
  
HBS 2004                                                        HBS 2009 
Lower-bound   Upper-bound                Lower-bound    Upper-bound 
     
 
105                       690                                   148                  919 
188                       787                                   205                  919 
258                       843                                   249                  899 
128                       375                                   165                  528 
26                         67                                      62                   183 
705                      2762                                   829                 3448 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Distribution of wage-earners by informality status  
HBS 2004 HBS 2009 
 
Lower-Bound  
Upper-Bound 
Social security registration 
Contract status 
Small firm employment 
Total number of wage-earners 
Formal           Informal 
5104                    705 
3047                   2762 
3649                   2160 
4726                   1083 
3833                    1976 
5809 
Formal             Informal 
6498                     829 
3879                     3448 
4756                     2571 
6146                     1181 
4747                     2580 
7327 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: 2004, Wage gap decomposition results 
Upper-bound informality Lower-bound informality 
Wage gap (100%) 0.844*** Wage gap (100%) 0.675*** 
 
(0.0187) 
 
(0.0328) 
Explained gap (64%) 0.540*** Explained gap (60%) 0.408*** 
 
(0.0153) 
 
(0.0214) 
Unexplained gap (36%) 0.304*** Unexplained gap (40%) 0.267*** 
 
(0.0142) 
 
(0.0272) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: 2009, Wage gap decomposition results 
Upper-bound informality Lower-bound informality 
Wage gap (100%) 0.885*** Wage gap (100%) 0.746*** 
 
(0.0175) 
 
(0.0321) 
Explained gap (64%) 0.562*** Explained gap (61%) 0.458*** 
 
(0.0144) 
 
(0.0191) 
Unexplained gap (36.5%) 0.323*** Unexplained gap (38.5%) 0.287*** 
 
(0.0133) 
 
(0.0263) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
 
 
 
Table 5: 2004, Wage gap decomposition results corrected for selection bias 
Lower-bound informality Upper-bound informality 
Wage gap (100%)         0.875***    Wage gap (100%) 0.883*** 
 
       (0.0351)  (0.0196) 
Explained gap (45.5%)         0.398***    Explained gap (61%)  0.539*** 
 
        (0.0200)  (0.0150) 
Unexplained gap(54.5%)  
 
         0.477*** 
       (0.0307) 
   Unexplained gap (38.8%) 
  
0.343*** 
(0.0155) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 6: 2009, Wage gap decomposition results corrected for selection bias 
Lower-bound informality Upper-bound informality 
Wage gap (100%) 0.945*** 
(0.0356) 
Wage gap (100%) 
 
0.908*** 
(0.0188) 
Explained gap (46%) 0.435*** Explained gap(62%) 0.561*** 
 
(0.0185)  (0.0142) 
Unexplained gap (54%) 0.510*** Unexplained gap (38%) 0.347*** 
 
(0.0307)  (0.0150) 
 
 
 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1: 2004, Lower-bound formal-informal wage differentials 
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Figure 2: 2004, Upper-bound formal-informal wage differential 
          
.15
.2
.25
.3
.35
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Quantile
Effect of covariates QR 95% confidence intervals
Formal-informal wage differential, 2004
  
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Quantile
Effect of coefficients QR 95% confidence intervals
Formal-informal wage differential, 2004
 
(a)                                                         (b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
Table 7: 2004, MM formal-informal wage gap results 
Panel A 
Lower-bound informality 
Quantiles  Raw gap Coefficient 
effect 
% Change  Covariate 
effect 
% Change Residuals 
0.10 0.801 0.403 
(0.033) 
50.31% 0.342 
(0.029) 
42.69% 0.056 
0.25 0.624 0.363 
(0.020) 
58.17% 0.279 
(0.019) 
44.71% -0.019 
0.50 0.554 0.332 
(0.017) 
60.00% 0.299 
(0.018) 
53.97% -0.077 
0.75 0.734 0.291 
(0.019) 
39.64% 0.372 
(0.021) 
50.68% 0.071 
0.90 0.693 0.351 
(0.028) 
50.64% 0.372 
(0.028) 
53.68% -0.030 
Panel B 
Upper-bound informality 
Quantiles Raw gap Coefficient 
effect 
% Change Covariate 
effect 
% Change Residuals 
0.10 0.916 0.662 
(0.021) 
72.27% 0.264 
(0.017) 
28.82% -0.010 
0.25 0.731 0.530 
(0.016) 
72.50% 0.282 
(0.015 
38.57% -0.081 
0.50 0.854 0.528 
(0.015 
61.83% 0.295 
(0.015 
34.54% 0.031 
0.75 0.892 0.589 
(0.017) 
66.03% 0.265 
(0.017) 
29.70% 0.038 
0.90 0.801 0.596 
(0.025) 
74.41% 0.233 
(0.022) 
29.08% -0.028 
Note:  Bootstrapped standard errors are given in parenthesis. 
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Figure 3: 2009, Lower-bound formal-informal wage differential 
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Figure 4: 2009, Upper-bound formal-informal wage differential 
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Table 8: 2009, MM formal-informal wage gap results 
Panel A 
Lower-bound informality 
Quantiles Raw 
gap 
Coefficient 
effect 
% 
Change 
Covariate 
effect 
% 
Change 
Residual 
0.1 0.981 0.571 
(0.031) 
58.20% 0.318 
(0.028) 
32.42% 0.092 
0.25 0.742 0.470 
(0.022) 
63.34% 0.281 
(0.019) 
37.87% -0.008 
0.5 0.616 0.360 
(0.016) 
58.44% 0.325 
(0.017) 
52.76% -0.068 
0.75 0.815 0.287 
(0.021) 
34.21% 0.456 
(0.020) 
55.95% 0.072 
0.9 0.778 0.175 
(0.025) 
22.49% 0.556 
(0.025) 
71.46% 0.048 
Panel B 
Upper-bound informality 
Quantiles Raw 
gap 
Coefficient effect % 
Change 
Covariate 
effect 
% 
Change 
Residual 
0.1 0.981 0.670 
(0.026) 
68.30% 0.276 
(0.019) 
28.13% 0.035 
0.25 0.704 0.474 
(0.017) 
67.33% 0.314 
(0.016) 
44.60% -0.084 
0.5 0.799 0.403 
(0.014) 
50.44% 0.416 
(0.016) 
52.06% -0.020 
0.75 0.992 0.409 
(0.018) 
41.23% 0.502 
(0.019) 
50.60% 0.082 
0.9 0.903 0.390 
(0.024) 
43.19% 0.521 
(0.024) 
57.70% -0.009 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are given in parenthesis 
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Table 9: 2004 and 2009 Nopo’s matching based decomposition of the formal-informal wage 
gap 
2004 
Lower-bound informality 
 
O X F I Matched 
workers 
Matched 
 formal 
Matched  
informal 
0.048 0.016 0.011 0.017 0.004 977 601 (61.5%) 376 (38.5%) 
Upper-bound informality 
 
O X F I Matched 
workers 
Matched  
formal 
Matched  
informal 
0.060 0.026 0.010 0.012 0.012 2606 1386 (53.2%) 1220 (46.8%) 
2009 
Lower-bound informality 
 
O X F I Matched 
workers 
Matched  
formal 
Matched 
informal 
1.260 0.547 0.278 0.395 0.041 2625 1971(75%) 654 (25%) 
Upper-bound informality 
 
O X F I Matched 
workers 
Matched  
formal 
Matched  
informal 
1.127 0.508 0.455 0.074 0.090 5561 3046 (54.8%) 2515 (45%) 
 
50 
 
Table 10: 2004 and 2009 Nopo's matching based decomposition of formal-informal wage gap 
by quantiles 
On the common support  
2004 2009 
Percentiles Lower-bound 
informality 
Upper-bound 
informality 
Lower-bound 
informality 
Upper-bound 
informality 
10 0.466 0.549 0.841 0.865 
20 0.400 0.464 0.693 0.636 
30 0.331 0.382 0.560 0.573 
40 0.364 0.424 0.535 0.591 
50 0.382 0.452 0.416 0.652 
60 0.283 0.560 0.368 0.800 
70 0.288 0.588 0.326 0.850 
80 0.345 0.629 0.296 0.875 
90 0.531 0.543 0.370 0.765 
Out of the common support  
2004 2009 
Percentiles Lower-bound 
informality 
Upper-bound 
informality 
Lower-bound 
informality 
Upper-bound 
informality 
10 1.022 1.211 1.381 1.480 
20 0.901 1.061 1.086 1.139 
30 0.717 1.135 0.827 1.086 
40 0.671 1.150 0.758 1.235 
50 0.731 1.179 0.811 1.335 
60 0.845 1.150 0.885 1.322 
70 0.912 1.140 1.002 1.291 
80 0.841 1.099 0.981 1.316 
90 0.721 0.984 0.808 1.141 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1: Survey of studies on the formal-informal wage gap in Turkey 
Author  Method Definition of 
informality 
Main findings 
 Aysit  Tansel (1999) OLS regression analysis with 
sample selection correction 
Social security 
coverage 
Results suggest significant 
informal wage penalty for both 
men and women 
Aysit Tansel (2000) OLS regression analysis with 
sample selection correction/ 
Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition method 
Social security 
coverage 
Results show that wages of 
men are higher in the formal 
sector than the informal sector 
and wages of self-employed 
individuals 
Levent et al. (2004) OLS regression analysis Social security 
coverage and 
firm size 
Significant informal wage 
penalty exists. 
Hulagu and Baskaya 
(2011) 
OLS regression analysis and 
Propensity Score Matching 
method (PSM) 
Social security 
coverage 
Results indicate significant 
informal wage penalty 
Tansel and Kan (2012) OLS regression analysis QR 
regression analysis 
Social security 
coverage 
Significant informal wage 
penalty was found using OLS.  
Results show significant 
informal wage penalty at lower 
quantiles 
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Table 2: Description of the variables 
Dependent Variables Definitions 
Log wage  Log of the hourly wage obtained from individuals’ monthly 
income from their main job. 
Independent Variables 
 
 
Experience age-schooling-6 
Sex 
 
Male dummy variable constructed as male=1 and female=0 
Education  
No-education =1 and zero otherwise if individuals are not able to read and 
write and individuals who are literate but have not completed 
any education. 
Primary school =1 and zero otherwise if individuals are completed 5 years 
primary school 
Primary education =1 and zero otherwise if individuals have completed 8 years 
primary education 
High school =1 and zero otherwise if individuals who have completed high 
school 
Vocational high school =1and zero otherwise if individuals have completed any 
vocational or technical high school 
University =1 and zero otherwise if individuals completed any 2-year 
colleges, 4-year faculties and postgraduate (master and 
doctorate) 
Marital Status  
Single =1 and zero otherwise if individuals have never married 
Married =1 and zero otherwise if individuals are currently married to 
living together 
Other marital status =1 and zero otherwise if individuals are widowed and divorced 
and separate 
Employment Location 
 
Urban dummy variable constructed as urban=1 and rural=0 
Industry  
Agriculture and mining =1 and zero otherwise if individuals work in agriculture and 
mining sectors 
Manufacturing and energy =1 and zero otherwise if individuals work in manufacturing and 
energy sectors 
Construction =1 and zero otherwise if individuals work in the construction 
sector 
Trade =1 and zero otherwise if individuals work in the trade sector 
Transportation =1 and zero otherwise if individuals work in the transportation 
sector 
Finance and other personals and social 
services 
=1 and zero otherwise if individuals work in finance and service 
sectors. 
Other Variables 
 
Occupations  
Professionals =1 and zero otherwise if individuals are engaged in teaching 
professions, physical, mathematical and engineering professions 
and other professions 
Legislators =1 and zero otherwise if individuals are legislators, senior 
officials and managers 
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Associate professionals =1 and zero otherwise if 
 
 
 they are engaged in teaching, life science and other associate 
professions 
Other professions =1 and zero otherwise if individuals are engaged in skilled 
agricultural work, service work, craft and related works 
Elementary profession =1 and zero otherwise if individuals are engaged in occupations 
as drivers, labourers in mining, construction and others 
Measure of Informality 
 
Productive Definition  
Contract =1 and zero otherwise if individuals have a permanent job as 
their main job 
Enterprise-based definition  
Small firm =1 and zero otherwise if individuals are employed in small 
firms excluding groups of professionals and technicians who 
represent highly productive and high earning groups 
Legalistic Definitions  
Social security registration =1 and zero otherwise if individuals are registered for any social 
security registration 
Estimates of Informality  
Upper-bound estimates of informality =1 and zero otherwise if individuals are either not registered for 
any social security or do not have a contract or are employed in 
small firms 
Lower-bound estimates of informality =1 and zero otherwise if individuals are not covered by any 
social security and do not have a contract and are employed in 
small firms 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the variables 
                    Panel A- Lower-bound informality 
 
HBS 2004 HBS 2009 
 Formal Informal Formal Informal 
Variables Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd. 
Log wage 14.61 0.79 13.93 0.82 1.34 0.83 0.59 0.87 
Experience 19.65 10.88 25.89 12.26 19.07 11.39 25.34 12.94 
Exp2 504.25 485.63 820.16 664.26 493.46 502.85 809.33 684.89 
Male 0.79 0.41 0.70 0.46 0.75 0.43 0.60 0.49 
Single 0.25 0.43 0.16 0.36 0.27 0.44 0.19 0.39 
Married 0.73 0.44 0.80 0.40 0.70 0.46 0.73 0.44 
Other m. status 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.17 0.08 0.27 
No educ. 0.04 0.19 0.18 0.39 0.04 0.19 0.16 0.37 
Primary sch. 0.34 0.47 0.62 0.48 0.29 0.45 0.60 0.49 
Primary educ. 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.32 0.17 0.37 0.14 0.35 
High sch. 0.22 0.42 0.06 0.23 0.14 0.35 0.05 0.21 
Vocational sch. 0.90 0.28 0.02 0.13 0.13 0.34 0.04 0.19 
University 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.05 0.23 0.42 0.01 0.08 
Agricul/ mining 0.04 0.21 0.23 0.42 0.03 0.16 0.24 0.43 
Manufacture/ enr 0.30 0.46 0.09 0.28 0.26 0.44 0.10 0.29 
Construct 0.05 0.22 0.39 0.49 0.06 0.23 0.31 0.46 
Trade 0.20 0.40 0.02 0.15 0.20 0.40 0.08 0.27 
Transport 0.08 0.26 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.23 0.01 0.11 
Finance and service 0.33 0.47 0.26 0.44 0.40 0.49 0.26 0.44 
Urban 0.83 0.38 0.60 0.49 0.82 0.38 0.62 0.48 
Total-N 5104 705 6498 829 
Panel B- Upper-bound informality 
 
HBS 2004 HBS 2009 
 
Formal Informal Formal Informal 
Variables Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd. 
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Log wage 14.93 0.64 14.09 0.77 1.67 0.71 0.79 0.78 
Experience 19.55 9.76 21.34 12.60 18.71 10.18 20.99 13.17 
Exp2 477.56 417.71 614.34 607.02 453.70 429.05 614.15 624.35 
Male 0.79 0.41 0.77 0.42 0.75 0.43 0.72 0.45 
Single 0.19 0.39 0.29 0.45 0.22 0.41 0.30 0.46 
Married 0.80 0.40 0.68 0.47 0.75 0.43 0.65 0.48 
Other m. status 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.21 
No educ. 0.01 0.11 0.10 0.30 0.01 0.11 0.10 0.30 
Primary sch. 0.25 0.43 0.51 0.50 0.22 0.41 0.45 0.50 
Primary educ. 0.11 0.31 0.17 0.37 0.12 0.32 0.21 0.41 
High sch. 0.24 0.43 0.16 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.11 0.31 
Vocational sch. 0.11 0.32 0.04 0.20 0.16 0.36 0.08 0.28 
University 0.28 0.45 0.03 0.17 0.34 0.47 0.05 0.21 
Agricul/ mining 0.02 0.13 0.12 0.33 0.02 0.12 0.09 0.29 
Manufacture/ enr 0.33 0.47 0.20 0.40 0.27 0.45 0.20 0.40 
Construct 0.03 0.16 0.17 0.37 0.03 0.17 0.15 0.36 
Trade 0.12 0.33 0.25 0.43 0.14 0.35 0.24 0.43 
Transport 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26 0.03 0.18 0.07 0.26 
Finance and service 0.44 0.50 0.19 0.39 0.50 0.50 0.24 0.43 
urban 0.85 0.36 0.75 0.44 0.86 0.35 0.74 0.44 
Total-N 3047 2762 3879 3448 
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Table 4: OLS regression results (unadjusted for sample selection bias) 
                                                                     Panel A-2004  
 
Lower-bound informality Upper-bound informality  
Formal workers Informal workers  Formal workers  Informal workers  
Experience 0.0519*** 0.0330** 0.0341*** 0.0415*** 
 
(0.00358) (0.0135) (0.00427) (0.00561) 
Exp2 -0.001*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(7.11e-05) (0.000221) (9.20e-05) (9.88e-05) 
Male 0.108*** 0.101 0.0281 0.223*** 
 
(0.0224) (0.0811) (0.0241) (0.0350) 
Married 0.192*** 0.0947 0.181*** 0.125** 
 
(0.0290) (0.127) (0.0315) (0.0488) 
Other m. status 0.0947 0.126 0.0366 0.171* 
 
(0.0646) (0.194) (0.0768) (0.0891) 
Primary sch. 0.328*** 0.238*** -0.00420 0.303*** 
 
(0.0487) (0.0853) (0.0852) (0.0489) 
Primary educ. 0.489*** 0.328*** 0.145* 0.384*** 
 
(0.0528) (0.125) (0.0882) (0.0596) 
High sch. 0.847*** 0.0830 0.397*** 0.701*** 
 
(0.0519) (0.153) (0.0869) (0.0613) 
Vocational sch. 0.910*** 0.713*** 0.509*** 0.612*** 
 
(0.0566) (0.242) (0.0894) (0.0824) 
University 1.400*** 0.713 0.893*** 1.267*** 
 
(0.0541) (0.550) (0.0874) (0.0909) 
Agricul/mining -0.413*** -0.201** 0.309*** -0.329*** 
 
(0.0458) (0.0953) (0.0709) (0.0536) 
Manufacture/enr -0.105*** -0.541*** -0.158*** -0.0229 
 
(0.0234) (0.115) (0.0234) (0.0433) 
Construct -0.172*** 0.131 0.0828 -0.0283 
 
(0.0417) (0.0863) (0.0590) (0.0476) 
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Trade -0.368*** -0.283 -0.309*** -0.151*** 
 
(0.0257) (0.206) (0.0310) (0.0419) 
Transport -0.0139 -0.364 0.0633 0.140** 
 
(0.0350) (0.325) (0.0396) (0.0593) 
Urban 0.0390* 0.134* 0.0104 0.0809** 
 
(0.0229) (0.0698) (0.0253) (0.0342) 
Constant 13.17*** 13.07*** 13.93*** 12.96*** 
 
(0.0623) (0.172) (0.0931) (0.0794) 
                                                 Panel B-2009  
Lower-bound informality Upper-bound informality  
Formal workers  Informal workers Formal workers  Informal workers 
Experience 0.0501*** 0.0567*** 0.0345*** 0.0431***  
(0.00290) (0.0110) (0.00358) (0.00453) 
Exp2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001***  
(5.87e-05) (0.000180) (7.88e-05) (8.04e-05) 
Male 0.192*** 0.441*** 0.157*** 0.300***  
(0.0191) (0.0802) (0.0212) (0.0299) 
Married 0.188*** -0.0205 0.154*** 0.0922**  
(0.0243) (0.106) (0.0263) (0.0418) 
Other m. status 0.120** 0.211 0.0642 0.198***  
(0.0493) (0.146) (0.0567) (0.0698) 
Primary sch. 0.247*** 0.0406 0.149* 0.124***  
(0.0431) (0.0796) (0.0794) (0.0445) 
Primary educ. 0.374*** 0.0822 0.323*** 0.162***  
(0.0455) (0.111) (0.0813) (0.0514) 
High sch. 0.714*** 0.264* 0.542*** 0.499***  
(0.0468) (0.152) (0.0811) (0.0583) 
Vocational sch. 0.727*** 0.329** 0.567*** 0.455***  
(0.0472) (0.165) (0.0811) (0.0614) 
University 1.371*** 0.648* 1.150*** 0.805***  
(0.0464) (0.363) (0.0805) (0.0724) 
Agricul/mining -0.387*** -0.488*** -0.207*** -0.357***  
(0.0499) (0.0924) (0.0718) (0.0495) 
Manufacture/enr -0.217*** -0.958*** -0.278*** -0.189*** 
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(0.0213) (0.104) (0.0228) (0.0374) 
Construct -0.223*** -0.228** -0.246*** -0.0533  
(0.0354) (0.0982) (0.0517) (0.0419) 
Trade -0.331*** -0.461*** -0.308*** -0.161***  
(0.0224) (0.127) (0.0270) (0.0361) 
Transport -0.418*** -0.276 -0.406*** -0.223***  
(0.0359) (0.246) (0.0504) (0.0517) 
Urban 0.103*** 0.0894 0.0555** 0.121***  
(0.0209) (0.0663) (0.0251) (0.0296) 
Constant -0.0667 -0.193 0.424*** -0.157**  
(0.0526) (0.156) (0.0869) (0.0671) 
Observations 6,498 829 3,879 3,448 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: OLS regression results (adjusted for sample selection bias) 
                                                          Panel A-2004  
 Lower-bound informality Upper-bound informality 
Variables Formal workers Informal workers    Formal workers        Informal workers 
Experience 0.041*** 0.033** 0.030*** 0.041*** 
 (0.004) (0.014) (0.005) (0.006) 
Exp2 -0.001*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.083*** 0.104 0.011 0.229*** 
 (0.023) (0.083) (0.025) (0.037) 
Married 0.139*** 0.096 0.160*** 0.129*** 
 (0.028) (0.126) (0.033) (0.046) 
Other m. status 0.056 0.129 0.011 0.182* 
 (0.064) (0.211) (0.072) (0.094) 
Primary sch. 0.288*** 0.236*** -0.011 0.297*** 
 (0.058) (0.088) (0.107) (0.053) 
Primary educ. 0.406*** 0.325*** 0.137 0.374*** 
 (0.060) (0.121) (0.107) (0.061) 
High sch. 0.688*** 0.076 0.370*** 0.686*** 
 (0.060) (0.136) (0.106) (0.064) 
Vocational sch. 0.725*** 0.689* 0.482*** 0.588*** 
 (0.063) (0.400) (0.109) (0.085) 
University 1.151*** 0.712*** 0.850*** 1.232*** 
 (0.063) (0.147) (0.108) (0.105) 
Urban 0.031 0.134* 0.006 0.083** 
 (0.023) (0.069) (0.025) (0.036) 
Agricul/mining -0.306*** -0.197** 0.325*** -0.317*** 
 (0.062) (0.090) (0.097) (0.058) 
Manufacture/enr -0.116*** -0.543*** -0.162*** -0.027 
(0.022) (0.129) (0.024) (0.045) 
Construct -0.040 0.135* 0.095 -0.019 
 (0.041) (0.077) (0.061) (0.047) 
Trade -0.259*** -0.281* -0.297*** -0.145*** 
 (0.026) (0.146) (0.034) (0.042) 
Transport 0.065* 
(0.037) 
-0.366 
(0.343) 
0.065 0.146** 
(0.044) (0.062) 
Lambda 0.417*** 0.037 0.230*** 0.091* 
 (0.022) (0.194) (0.035) (0.053) 
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Constant 13.624*** 13.073*** 14.044*** 12.951*** 
 (0.080) (0.176) (0.118) (0.087) 
Observations 5,104 705 3,047 2,762 
R-squared 0.465 0.152 0.404 0.196 
  Panel B-2009   
 Lower-bound informality Upper-bound informality 
 Formal workers Informal workers Formal workers Informal workers 
Experience 0.040*** 0.057*** 0.032*** 0.043*** 
 (0.003) (0.012) (0.004) (0.005) 
Exp2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.163*** 0.442*** 0.147*** 0.300*** 
 (0.019) (0.084) (0.021) (0.032) 
Married 0.144*** -0.021 0.140*** 0.093** 
 (0.024) (0.117) (0.029) (0.042) 
Other m. status 0.088** 0.212 0.048 0.199*** 
 (0.042) (0.162) (0.054) (0.066) 
Primary sch. 0.204*** 0.040 0.141* 0.123*** 
 (0.048) (0.077) (0.079) (0.048) 
Primary educ. 0.296*** 0.081 0.312*** 0.161*** 
(0.051) (0.109) (0.081) (0.055) 
High sch. 0.566*** 0.262 0.520*** 0.498*** 
 (0.052) (0.193) (0.082) (0.062) 
Vocational sch. 0.560*** 0.327* 0.543*** 0.453*** 
 (0.052) (0.181) (0.082) (0.061) 
University 1.117*** 0.644 1.113*** 0.803*** 
 (0.055) (0.435) (0.083) (0.100) 
Urban 0.072*** 0.089 0.047** 0.121*** 
 (0.020) (0.068) (0.023) (0.029) 
Agricul/mining -0.327*** -0.487*** -0.190*** -0.356*** 
 (0.054) (0.094) (0.069) (0.050) 
Manufacture/enr -0.227*** -0.958*** -0.279*** -0.189*** 
 (0.023) (0.129) (0.024) (0.043) 
Construct -0.112*** -0.227** -0.230*** -0.053 
(0.033) (0.109) (0.052) (0.042) 
Trade -0.257*** -0.460*** -0.302*** -0.160*** 
 (0.023) (0.138) (0.029) (0.036) 
Transport -0.336*** -0.274 -0.399*** -0.223*** 
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 (0.037) (0.227) (0.050) (0.051) 
Lambda 0.405*** 0.012 0.148*** 0.006 
 (0.020) (0.141) (0.033) (0.042) 
Constant 0.396*** -0.193 0.508*** -0.157** 
 (0.065) (0.161) (0.092) (0.075) 
Observations 6,498 829 3,879 3,448 
R-squared 0.477 0.214 0.449 0.173 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6:2004, Quantile regression estimates for formal and informal workers 
 Panel A  
Lower-bound informality 
  Formal workers Informal workers 
Variables q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
Experience 0.067*** 0.062*** 0.053*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.022 0.018 0.033** 0.040*** 0.055***  
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.024) (0.020) (0.014) (0.015) (0.020) 
Exp2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.001** -0.001**  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.126*** 0.096*** 0.078*** 0.084*** 0.054 0.394*** 0.322*** 0.148 -0.089 -0.293**  
(0.041) (0.025) (0.023) (0.026) (0.047) (0.123) (0.106) (0.094) (0.101) (0.137) 
Married 0.217*** 0.171*** 0.165*** 0.213*** 0.252*** 0.519** 0.108 0.065 0.031 -0.201  
(0.057) (0.033) (0.023) (0.036) (0.052) (0.206) (0.173) (0.137) (0.141) (0.265) 
Other m. status 0.212 0.032 0.029 0.057 0.071 0.592 0.229 0.010 -0.066 -0.207  
(0.129) (0.067) (0.060) (0.074) (0.127) (0.424) (0.228) (0.222) (0.321) (0.505) 
Primary sch. 0.314*** 0.304*** 0.316*** 0.299*** 0.234** 0.235 0.318** 0.210** 0.211* 0.211*  
(0.102) (0.067) (0.052) (0.086) (0.093) (0.146) (0.133) (0.097) (0.127) (0.128) 
Primary educ. 0.481*** 0.412*** 0.477*** 0.493*** 0.368*** 0.419** 0.353** 0.370*** 0.344** 0.157  
(0.107) (0.071) (0.061) (0.090) (0.097) (0.184) (0.178) (0.132) (0.167) (0.172) 
High sch. 0.791*** 0.779*** 0.813*** 0.765*** 0.701*** 0.519** 0.213 0.072 0.009 0.142  
(0.108) (0.070) (0.056) (0.089) (0.101) (0.231) (0.178) (0.138) (0.211) (0.208) 
Vocational sch. 0.828*** 0.834*** 0.895*** 0.959*** 0.865*** 0.573* 0.553 0.370 0.442 0.932  
(0.115) (0.077) (0.060) (0.096) (0.102) (0.327) (0.343) (0.395) (0.574) (0.941) 
University  1.387*** 1.336*** 1.327*** 1.382*** 1.385*** 1.333** 1.064*** 0.811*** 0.504** 0.094  
(0.106) (0.071) (0.056) (0.091) (0.107) (0.535) (0.410) (0.287) (0.221) (0.176) 
Agricul/mining -0.847*** -0.607*** -0.461*** -0.184** -0.011 -0.462*** -0.413*** -0.033 -0.103 0.077  
(0.122) (0.089) (0.075) (0.080) (0.131) (0.163) (0.122) (0.099) (0.141) (0.160) 
Manufacture/enr -0.044 -0.100*** -0.128*** -0.097*** -0.066 -0.855*** -0.738*** -0.421** -0.422*** -0.380***  
(0.039) (0.028) (0.025) (0.027) (0.047) (0.208) (0.194) (0.211) (0.154) (0.119) 
Construct -0.308*** -0.237*** -0.165*** -0.091* 0.010 -0.004 0.035 0.211*** 0.085 0.254*  
(0.067) (0.054) (0.046) (0.051) (0.081) (0.126) (0.093) (0.079) (0.098) (0.142) 
Trade -0.365*** -0.381*** -0.406*** -0.326*** -0.266*** -0.027 -0.307 -0.270 -0.392 -0.298  
(0.044) (0.030) (0.027) (0.029) (0.059) (0.250) (0.202) (0.179) (0.245) (0.323) 
Transport -0.132** -0.117*** -0.075* 0.081* 0.095 -0.859 -0.543 -0.358 -0.005 -0.149  
(0.058) (0.042) (0.043) (0.045) (0.062) (0.677) (0.649) (0.500) (0.390) (0.337) 
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Urban 0.094** 0.043 0.021 0.026 -0.009 0.132 0.119 0.220*** 0.154* 0.197*  
(0.043) (0.030) (0.025) (0.026) (0.048) (0.141) (0.081) (0.066) (0.085) (0.111) 
Constant 12.392*** 12.868*** 13.263*** 13.568*** 13.891*** 11.922*** 12.651*** 12.951*** 13.623*** 13.995***  
(0.118) (0.091) (0.083) (0.105) (0.118) (0.318) (0.245) (0.187) (0.212) (0.283) 
Observations 5,104 5,104 5,104 5,104 5,104 705 705 705 705 705 
 Panel B  
Upper-bound informality 
  Formal workers Informal workers  
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
Experience 0.049*** 0.037*** 0.027*** 0.018*** 0.030*** 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.038*** 0.043*** 0.050***  
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) 
Exp2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.075** 0.083*** 0.037 0.025 0.014 0.432*** 0.304*** 0.144*** 0.080** 0.136**  
(0.030) (0.027) (0.025) (0.034) (0.063) (0.072) (0.053) (0.038) (0.040) (0.055) 
Married 0.106*** 0.135*** 0.195*** 0.300*** 0.215*** 0.191** 0.115** 0.129*** 0.089* 0.122*  
(0.038) (0.036) (0.030) (0.041) (0.073) (0.083) (0.055) (0.046) (0.051) (0.065) 
Other m. status 0.122 0.039 0.073 0.085 -0.049 0.180 0.182* 0.083 0.088 0.161  
(0.090) (0.083) (0.077) (0.106) (0.179) (0.162) (0.108) (0.109) (0.098) (0.220) 
Primary sch. 0.083 0.103 -0.027 -0.036 0.040 0.359*** 0.355*** 0.255*** 0.329*** 0.157*  
(0.133) (0.120) (0.143) (0.122) (0.226) (0.091) (0.072) (0.059) (0.075) (0.083) 
Primary educ. 0.252* 0.287** 0.173 0.111 0.148 0.468*** 0.409*** 0.313*** 0.422*** 0.291***  
(0.135) (0.122) (0.144) (0.123) (0.232) (0.109) (0.081) (0.067) (0.084) (0.096) 
High sch. 0.483*** 0.519*** 0.374*** 0.295** 0.385* 0.766*** 0.649*** 0.573*** 0.698*** 0.653***  
(0.135) (0.121) (0.143) (0.122) (0.232) (0.109) (0.080) (0.075) (0.088) (0.110) 
Vocational sch. 0.588*** 0.583*** 0.494*** 0.540*** 0.581** 0.612*** 0.600*** 0.454*** 0.645*** 0.519***  
(0.140) (0.126) (0.145) (0.127) (0.231) (0.156) (0.089) (0.088) (0.125) (0.154) 
University  0.936*** 0.956*** 0.854*** 0.871*** 1.056*** 1.245*** 1.120*** 1.117*** 1.242*** 1.682***  
(0.136) (0.122) (0.145) (0.125) (0.232) (0.159) (0.119) (0.103) (0.183) (0.269) 
Agricul/mining 0.002 0.183 0.322*** 0.540*** 0.450** -0.546*** -0.351*** -0.203*** -0.224*** -0.335***  
(0.164) (0.120) (0.123) (0.116) (0.192) (0.107) (0.082) (0.062) (0.075) (0.120) 
Manufacture/enr -0.226*** -0.224*** -0.191*** -0.109*** -0.031 0.053 0.108** 0.080* -0.084* -0.222**  
(0.028) (0.033) (0.028) (0.033) (0.045) (0.090) (0.049) (0.047) (0.047) (0.104) 
Construct -0.301** -0.010 0.120* 0.282*** 0.142** -0.014 0.011 0.077 -0.030 -0.191*  
(0.153) (0.108) (0.072) (0.094) (0.069) (0.099) (0.048) (0.052) (0.054) (0.107) 
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Trade -0.391*** -0.381*** -0.366*** -0.240*** -0.067 -0.049 -0.048 -0.095** -0.196*** -0.382***  
(0.043) (0.041) (0.038) (0.053) (0.088) (0.079) (0.041) (0.048) (0.049) (0.097) 
Transport -0.147** -0.065 0.108** 0.128** 0.119 0.140 0.154*** 0.111* 0.068 0.128  
(0.057) (0.068) (0.043) (0.050) (0.096) (0.096) (0.049) (0.062) (0.078) (0.151) 
Urban 0.024 0.015 0.007 0.016 -0.015 0.122** 0.152*** 0.117*** 0.067 -0.003  
(0.053) (0.033) (0.025) (0.038) (0.061) (0.062) (0.038) (0.036) (0.045) (0.071) 
Constant 13.278*** 13.547*** 13.985*** 14.238*** 14.353*** 11.906*** 12.412*** 13.052*** 13.423*** 13.912***  
(0.163) (0.134) (0.149) (0.132) (0.239) (0.154) (0.099) (0.106) (0.108) (0.152) 
Observations 3,047 3,047 3,047 3,047 3,047 2,762 2,762 2,762 2,762 2,762 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: 2009, Quantile regression estimates for formal and informal workers-lower-bound informality  
Panel A 
 Lower-bound informality 
  Formal workers Informal workers 
Variables q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
Experience 0.064*** 0.056*** 0.047*** 0.041*** 0.034*** 0.100*** 0.056*** 0.050*** 0.054*** 0.044*  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.026) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.023) 
Exp2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.224*** 0.159*** 0.176*** 0.194*** 0.204*** 0.500*** 0.413*** 0.384*** 0.317*** 0.369*  
(0.037) (0.028) (0.016) (0.023) (0.026) (0.148) (0.113) (0.084) (0.106) (0.196) 
Married 0.265*** 0.197*** 0.143*** 0.167*** 0.171*** -0.264 0.062 0.021 -0.105 -0.058  
(0.041) (0.038) (0.021) (0.023) (0.036) (0.225) (0.134) (0.131) (0.155) (0.207) 
Other m. status 0.252*** 0.155** 0.040 0.047 0.070 -0.252 0.438** 0.282 0.153 0.094  
(0.080) (0.062) (0.041) (0.055) (0.075) (0.380) (0.197) (0.184) (0.191) (0.252) 
Primary sch. 0.261* 0.191*** 0.207*** 0.153*** 0.162** -0.106 -0.021 0.066 -0.003 0.043  
(0.150) (0.062) (0.060) (0.059) (0.074) (0.156) (0.106) (0.086) (0.099) (0.156) 
Primary educ. 0.322** 0.312*** 0.355*** 0.354*** 0.330*** 0.005 0.142 0.111 -0.007 0.040  
(0.158) (0.063) (0.062) (0.061) (0.075) (0.252) (0.157) (0.127) (0.136) (0.231) 
High sch. 0.644*** 0.638*** 0.696*** 0.614*** 0.613*** -0.003 -0.116 0.254 0.126 0.215  
(0.157) (0.068) (0.064) (0.063) (0.075) (0.235) (0.271) (0.195) (0.212) (0.857) 
Vocational sch. 0.714*** 0.681*** 0.673*** 0.641*** 0.671*** 0.093 0.329 0.428*** 0.158 0.556  
(0.158) (0.065) (0.065) (0.061) (0.077) (0.411) (0.260) (0.155) (0.244) (0.461) 
University  1.302*** 1.304*** 1.321*** 1.267*** 1.400*** 0.384 0.677 0.755 0.492 0.927  
(0.158) (0.066) (0.063) (0.064) (0.078) (0.641) (0.702) (0.593) (0.609) (0.645) 
Agricul/mining -0.584*** -0.450*** -0.366*** -0.386*** -0.229** -0.456*** -0.413*** -0.414*** -0.466*** -0.697***  
(0.124) (0.086) (0.057) (0.054) (0.109) (0.159) (0.138) (0.096) (0.125) (0.204) 
Manufacture/enr -0.150*** -0.127*** -0.227*** -0.273*** -0.223*** -1.373*** -1.057*** -0.876*** -0.828*** -0.705**  
(0.036) (0.029) (0.023) (0.026) (0.030) (0.263) (0.286) (0.136) (0.187) (0.327) 
Construct -0.183*** -0.176*** -0.260*** -0.247*** -0.228*** -0.294 -0.089 -0.122 -0.101 -0.367*  
(0.061) (0.040) (0.031) (0.043) (0.044) (0.203) (0.138) (0.109) (0.145) (0.215) 
Trade -0.262*** -0.299*** -0.380*** -0.389*** -0.303*** -0.664** -0.317** -0.288** -0.454*** -0.619**  
(0.035) (0.029) (0.024) (0.029) (0.045) (0.292) (0.154) (0.140) (0.169) (0.263) 
Transport -0.416*** -0.402*** -0.410*** -0.442*** -0.341*** -0.095 -0.378 -0.322 -0.507 -0.894  
(0.072) (0.057) (0.035) (0.041) (0.062) (0.390) (0.310) (0.264) (0.389) (0.715) 
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Urban 0.128*** 0.113*** 0.109*** 0.093*** 0.077** 0.099 0.125 0.079 0.128 0.151  
(0.034) (0.026) (0.022) (0.024) (0.031) (0.130) (0.095) (0.070) (0.085) (0.126) 
Constant -0.925*** -0.411*** 0.073 0.491*** 0.737*** -1.361*** -0.719*** -0.200 0.378* 0.895***  
(0.165) (0.071) (0.071) (0.070) (0.086) (0.299) (0.225) (0.182) (0.193) (0.341) 
Observations 6,498 6,498 6,498 6,498 6,498 829 829 829 829 829 
 Panel B  
Upper-bound informality 
  Formal workers Informal workers 
 q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
Experience 0.050*** 0.042*** 0.029*** 0.020*** 0.027*** 0.063*** 0.046*** 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.041***  
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
Exp2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.134*** 0.113*** 0.151*** 0.168*** 0.172*** 0.562*** 0.371*** 0.222*** 0.217*** 0.229***  
(0.033) (0.029) (0.020) (0.026) (0.032) (0.069) (0.046) (0.033) (0.033) (0.053) 
Married 0.106** 0.107*** 0.172*** 0.180*** 0.161*** 0.144 0.093* 0.100** 0.051 0.135**  
(0.051) (0.035) (0.026) (0.034) (0.041) (0.108) (0.055) (0.043) (0.043) (0.060) 
Other m. status 0.070 0.020 0.030 0.065 0.081 0.351** 0.276*** 0.143** 0.167 0.110  
(0.101) (0.060) (0.050) (0.079) (0.092) (0.162) (0.079) (0.072) (0.102) (0.092) 
Primary sch. 0.068 0.091 0.160 0.089 0.134 0.134 0.102 0.122*** 0.085* 0.080  
(0.177) (0.083) (0.112) (0.090) (0.086) (0.153) (0.066) (0.046) (0.051) (0.087) 
Primary educ. 0.241 0.262*** 0.381*** 0.251*** 0.223*** 0.105 0.078 0.178*** 0.172*** 0.206**  
(0.181) (0.088) (0.113) (0.087) (0.082) (0.158) (0.077) (0.053) (0.053) (0.088) 
High sch. 0.420** 0.520*** 0.571*** 0.507*** 0.526*** 0.548*** 0.440*** 0.426*** 0.424*** 0.459***  
(0.184) (0.091) (0.111) (0.089) (0.081) (0.158) (0.077) (0.061) (0.063) (0.103) 
Vocational sch. 0.399** 0.484*** 0.607*** 0.543*** 0.590*** 0.616*** 0.463*** 0.438*** 0.338*** 0.359***  
(0.184) (0.090) (0.113) (0.090) (0.086) (0.164) (0.072) (0.059) (0.059) (0.102) 
University  0.939*** 1.033*** 1.127*** 1.123*** 1.281*** 0.746*** 0.733*** 0.677*** 0.758*** 1.074***  
(0.185) (0.086) (0.112) (0.092) (0.087) (0.222) (0.096) (0.070) (0.150) (0.169) 
Agricul/mining -0.151 -0.274*** -0.257*** -0.114 -0.084 -0.408*** -0.376*** -0.340*** -0.314*** -0.473***  
(0.122) (0.081) (0.082) (0.108) (0.123) (0.103) (0.082) (0.056) (0.055) (0.089) 
Manufacture/enr -0.216*** -0.255*** -0.318*** -0.256*** -0.212*** -0.213*** -0.082 -0.027 -0.181*** -0.328***  
(0.036) (0.034) (0.031) (0.028) (0.038) (0.078) (0.053) (0.035) (0.042) (0.079) 
Construct -0.196*** -0.262*** -0.321*** -0.263*** -0.165 -0.024 0.002 0.019 0.003 -0.183**  
(0.065) (0.063) (0.060) (0.066) (0.116) (0.086) (0.047) (0.037) (0.055) (0.072) 
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Trade -0.296*** -0.394*** -0.381*** -0.275*** -0.119** -0.082 -0.064 -0.091*** -0.206*** -0.380***  
(0.036) (0.034) (0.037) (0.044) (0.053) (0.065) (0.039) (0.035) (0.043) (0.073) 
Transport -0.391*** -0.395*** -0.466*** -0.421*** -0.346*** -0.196* -0.183*** -0.113** -0.247*** -0.362***  
(0.080) (0.064) (0.042) (0.057) (0.103) (0.110) (0.059) (0.047) (0.057) (0.101) 
Urban 0.034 0.068** 0.043* 0.062** 0.051 0.108* 0.119*** 0.148*** 0.123*** 0.116**  
(0.038) (0.030) (0.025) (0.027) (0.038) (0.062) (0.038) (0.027) (0.031) (0.057) 
Constant -0.104 0.208** 0.503*** 0.825*** 0.934*** -1.339*** -0.583*** -0.084 0.364*** 0.740***  
(0.194) (0.101) (0.121) (0.097) (0.100) (0.194) (0.095) (0.067) (0.069) (0.126) 
Observations 3,879 3,879 3,879 3,879 3,879 3,448 3,448 3,448 3,448 3,448 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
